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Abstract:
Using the conceptual framework of a developmental state, forwarded by the Economic
Commission for Africa, it was found that Ethiopia’s democratic developmental state is unique
and operates differently from the Malaysian developmental state model. Economically, Ethiopia
has recorded staggering economic growth since it adopted the developmental state. The
Malaysian developmental state was developed to be market-oriented and as a result Malaysia’s
GDP grew at 5.23 percent from 2005-2011. Malaysia’s incidence of poverty declined from 49%
in 1970 to less than 5% in 2000. Ethiopia has focused on a planned developmental state, without
speeding the direction of industrialization, and has achieved an average 9.9 percent growth rate
in GDP from 2005-2011. With economic growth, the poverty reduction measured by poverty
head count in Ethiopia has declined from 41.9 in 2005 to 29.6 percent in 2011. Although
Ethiopia’s Human Development Index (HDI) has increased by 16% from 2005 to 2011, its HDI
score is about 22% less than the average score of sub-Saharan countries. The poverty ratio of
people living on less than $1.25 a day in Ethiopia is very close to about 30 percent. It means that
those with low incomes have not benefitted from the staggering economic growth that much of
the country has achieved in the last seven years.
The theory of a developmental state model proposes that professional bureaucratic elites design,
manage, and run autonomously the short and long range plans of a country. In the Ethiopian
“Democratic Developmental State” the short and long term plans are controlled by the ruling
party, EPRD. The public and private sectors are minimally involved in the planning process. The
economic growth rate which Ethiopia achieved from 2005 to 2011 doesn’t operate in a fully
market-friendly environment. Far from operating in a developmental state, Ethiopia operates
under a centralized system. Also, in an era of economic globalism, the Malaysian type of
developmental state model is outdated and is no longer relevant for Ethiopia. Therefore, to
achieve optimal sustainable development, and thereby feed its people, Ethiopia must focus on an
integrated, environmentally sensitive, and cooperative agriculturally-based type of development
model.
Keywords:
Democratic Developmental state, environmentally-friendly market system,
centrally-planned system, state-led growth, autonomous professional elites.
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Introduction
The Economic Commission for Africa (2011) argues that African States would catch up and
accomplish a vibrant economic system if they could emulate Malaysia’s developmental state
model along with addressing democratic values that would allow the citizens to play meaningful
roles in the country’s governance. With this understanding in mind, the purpose of this study is
first to determine if Ethiopia has established the groundwork necessary for the implementation of
a developmental state that is similar to the Malaysian developmental state model; and second to
ask if the Ethiopian developmental state model is moving towards establishing a participatory
democratic developmental state, unlike the East Asian authoritarian developmental states which
have postponed democracy until economic development is achieved.
The comparison of the developmental strategies of Malaysia and Ethiopia is based on the
following characteristics of the developmental state model as suggested by Johnson (1982),
Wade (1990), Fingleton (1996) and Dadzie (2012). According to their assessment, a
developmental state is:
a) autonomous and heavily involved in a macroeconomic planning process, needed
to promote structural transformation and which plays a strategic role in economic
development;
b) staffed by highly qualified, professional government elites (i.e., insulated from the
political process and not influenced by politicians, workers or the corporate class
through the political process) who are given sufficient latitude to develop
initiatives and operate effectively;
c) selfless in designing strategic visions, planning innovative processes, formulating
appropriate policies and implementing plans to transform their societies;
d) a catalyst for efficiently executing the developmental (industrialization) goals of
the nation;
e) democratic, allowing the citizens to play meaningful roles in the country’s
governance process;
f) encouraging to public-private strategic coalitions or cooperatives that are shaped
by societal forces;
g) supportive of entrepreneurs who undertake risky ventures;
h) equipped with infrastructures, trained human and social capital and politically
stable environments to entice foreign investors with capital, management, and
marketing expertise to invest in the country.
More specifically, to assess the Ethiopian developmental state based on the attributes of the
Malaysian developmental state, as forwarded by the Economic Commission for Africa, the
following vital questions are posed:
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1) Is Ethiopia’s commitment to the democratic development state goal supported by a
strong vision that is tailored to trigger a process of profound societal transformation?
2) Is the developmental state planning process in Ethiopia designed by competent,
efficient and autonomous professional bureaucrats who work collaboratively with the
private sector in policy-making efforts?
3) Is the developmental state plan in Ethiopia managed by competent, professional
bureaucrats that are solely recruited on meritocracy to work autonomously---free
from forming close relations with the politico-legislative elites?
4) Are the Ethiopian bureaucratic elites free from corruption and rent-seeking
mechanisms in order to effectively manage and perform their duties?
5) To attract foreign investors with capital, management, and marketing expertise, is
the Ethiopian environment equipped with an investor-friendly and permissive
environment equipped with 1) the necessary infrastructures, 2) trained human capital,
and 3) a politically stable environment that includes well established rules of law and
social accountability?
6) Is the Ethiopian developmental state operating in a democratization process that calls
for accountability, transparency, and the participation of the public in policy-making?
The Vision of a Developmental State
The history of development in Malaysia points out that an important component of development
relies on state action. That is, state action in industrial upgrading, employment generation,
reduction of inequality, and the protection of civil liberties is necessary to prevent
underdevelopment. Infused with private sector ingenuity, the autonomous public sector in
Malaysia has been used as a catalyst for development to meet the overarching, ‘2020 Malaysia
developmental Vision.’ That is, the 2020 Malaysian Vision was planned by the Malaysian
government to create a fully developed nation and to facilitate growth with improved equity and
poverty reduction. As a result, the expansion of economic coordination and due to judicious state
intervention within the Malaysian developmental state, schools, roads, health centers and public
housing have made a steady transition from poverty towards achieving its developmental state
agenda (Khoo, S. 2007).
As in Malaysia, since 2004, Ethiopia has identified the development of agriculture as a means to
industrial development and has made this a priority policy. Recently, the policy makers in
Ethiopia have embarked on the five-year Growth and Transformation Plan (GTP) for the period
2010/11 to 2014/15, to achieve not only the United Nations Millennium Development Goals but
also to develop Ethiopia into one of the middle income countries by 2020-2030 (Kunama, G.
May 12, 2011).
To rekindle the Ethiopian economy, which was on the brink of colossal failure during the
military (Derge) regime, Ethiopia’s current Democratic Developmental State Model has been
http://www.ijmsbr.com
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guided by very strong governmental intervention in the market, giving power and authority to the
government bureaucracy to plan, supervise, and implement the developmental processes of the
country. The developmental state governs the process of investing in key economic sectors. The
matrix presented in Table 1 gives a template that can be used to compare the conditions of the
developmental states operating in both Malaysia and Ethiopia. For the last seven years (i.e.,
2005-2011), while Malaysia’s GDP grew at 5.23 percent, Ethiopia, without speeding the
direction of industrialization and being mainly centralized rather than fully market-oriented,
achieved an average of 9.9 percent growth rate in its GDP.
As targeted by the Malaysian Developmental State Model, the incidence of poverty in Malaysia
declined from 49% in 1970 to about 5% in 2000 (Khoo, 2007). Realizing record economic
growth, the poverty reduction measured by poverty head count in Ethiopia has declined from
41.9% in 2005 to 29.6% in 2011, significant when considering the time span. Similarly, Ethiopia
has achieved a remarkable trend in establishing health services according to its 0.619 health
index (compared to Malaysia’s health index of 0.855). Similarly, due to poverty reduction and
access to health benefits and the expansion of the Ethiopian economy, the Human Development
Index (HDI), measuring life expectancy, the level of schooling (adult literacy rate), and real
GDP per capita (standard of living), Malaysia’s HDI improved by 3.1% (i.e., from 0.738 in 2005
to 0.761 in 2011), whereas, even though Ethiopia’s HDI improved by 16% (i.e., from 0.313 in
2005 to 0.363 in 2011), its HDI score is about 22% less than the average score of sub-Saharan
countries.
One can conclude that the Ethiopian developmental state has played an important role in
supporting quantitative economic growth. However, those with low incomes don’t appear to
benefit from the staggering economic growth of the country. The poverty ratio of people living
on less than $1.25 a day in Ethiopia is very close to about 30 percent. Based on the extreme
social inequalities and abject poverty that still exist in the country, it is possible to show that the
majority of Ethiopians have not been able to share the benefits of the country’s economic growth
during the last seven years. It is also possible that Ethiopia may not achieve what it has set for its
2015 Millennium Development Goal because of escalating fuel prices, loose monetary policy
mainly used for public infrastructure investment, and high prices of edible food products.
The Ethiopian government is expected to spend 4.5% of GDP to attain the Millennium
Development Goal of 100% primary school completion by 2015 (World Bank, 2005, p. 172),
but as shown in Table 1, Ethiopia’s GDP expenditure on education is 5.5%, compared to
Malaysia’s 4.6%. Nonetheless, the education index of Ethiopia is only 0.237 compared to 0.73
for Malaysia. That is, while 73% of the school age children in Malaysia complete primary and
secondary schools only 24% of Ethiopian children complete their primary and secondary
schooling. In addition, in terms of quality and equity, Ethiopia has the highest student-teacher
ratio in the world. It was reported by the World Bank that since 1993-94, the pupil-teacher ratio
http://www.ijmsbr.com
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is 65:1 and the number of pupils per section is 75 to 82 in government primary schools,
compared with about 30:1 in privately operated schools in non-governmental organizations
(2005, p. xxiv). Thus, when compared with Malaysia, Ethiopia gives less emphasis on
investment in human capital as an important ingredient for economic transformation and the
assumptions of the developmental state model.
If Ethiopia’s intended plans and visions had been fully implemented, there is no doubt they could
have achieved their intended goals. However, many fruitful projects were delayed because the
governmental functionaries lacked the professionalism and commitment needed to mobilize the
limited resources of the nation (See Desta, July 7, 2011). Put differently, if the Ethiopian
functionaries had been willing to operate efficiently to address the economic challenges of the
country and if government intervention had been implemented carefully, there is little doubt that
these plans would have generated the greatest welfare for the largest numbers of Ethiopians.
There was a missing precondition in Ethiopia’s developmental policies that having to do with
rent-seeking practices. As pointed out by Fischer (2011; Kaufmann, 1998, p. 524) since rentseeking is a means of resistance to reform, it may be seen as a kind of ‘legitimized theft’
purposely designed by government officials to appropriate rent in order to maximize their ability
to embezzle funds and demand bribes from their clients. In addition, rent-seekers may also be
powerful interest groups or lobbyists who exert considerable influence, who bribe government
bureaucrats to hinder competitors so that their inefficient companies win governmental tenders.
Thus, as a result of rent-seeking, many projects have not been implemented adequately in
Ethiopia and as a result the policy outcomes have been negatively affected. It is also possible that
austerity measures might not have been whole-heartedly endorsed by the ruling party. Also, the
government’s decisions to introduce reforms might have lacked coalition support by policy
advisers and technocrats. As stated by Pang (2000), technocrats generally make decisions with
national interest at heart, but with an eye to global realities. “What matters to them is what their
colleagues overseas think of their actions. They are interchangeable technocrats, moveable parts
of the their governments, often influenced by the views of those sitting in Washington, London,
Bonn , Paris…”.
Finally, the Ethiopian government’s vision is to enhance large and ambitious development
projects in order to accomplish the five year Growth and Transformation Plan in the short run,
end poverty and become a middle income country in the long run. Instead of searching for the
optimal combinations of local resources, Ethiopia’s developmental state calls for foreign capital
to finance its yearly budgets deficits, thus it may be very difficult to accomplish its ambitious
plans (See for example, Ohashi, Nazret.com, 6/9/2011).
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Table 1: The Economic and Social Performance of Ethiopian Developmental State
(2000-2011)
Malaysia
Ethiopia
Indicators
2000
2005
2011
2000
2005

0.738

Human Dev. 0.705
Index
(value)
Heath Status
Life
Expectancy(y
ears)
Health index

0.761

0.274

74. 2

2011

0.313

0.36
3

52

59.
3
0.619

0.855
Expenditure
on health (%
GDP)
Economic
Status
Real GDP/
capita ($)
Annual GDP 8.9
Growth (%)
Poverty ratio,
people living
below
$1.
25/day (%)
Consumer
price index
Education

2.2
1.9

4937.43

School life
expectancy
Education
index
Primary
school
enrollment
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5.3

10, 429. 51
5.16

119.28

605.71

6.1

11.8

8.0

41.9

39.0

29.6

38

40..0

<5.0

9.0

22.0

4.
3

11.5
0.73
0.70

0.237
61.6

74.2

90.
7

Page 92

International Journal of Management Sciences and Business Research, 2012,

Secondary
school
enrollment
Educ.
Exp/GDP

Vol. 1, Issue 11. (ISSN: 2226-8235)

17.1

4.6

23.1

20.3

5.5

Source: CSA abstract, 2003-2011;LISANE MASIE, March, 2012; World Bank (2011), World
Bank Indicators 2011, Washington, D.C.

Meritocratic Bureaucracy
For elites and state institutions to play leading roles in steering the economy, the developmental
state needs to be relatively autonomous. As stated by Nordlinger (1987:361), autonomy is
defined simply to mean that the state achieves independence from the demanding clamor of
special interest groups. Evans (1994) argues that a developmental state is more effective and
efficient than a predatory (parasitic) state because it is managed and run by autonomous
professional elites. Starting in the 1990s, being accountable to the public, the civil service in
Malaysia has become embedded with the private sector and together they have been able to coordinate the economy. Thus, as stated by Zalanga (2012), using the “Client’s Charter” reform,
Malaysia has empowered the public by letting them know the minimum to expect from their
public servants.
In line with highly selective meritocratic recruitment and long-term career rewards, the civil
servants in Malaysia are recruited through a rigorous national examination system. Once
employed, the employees undergo thorough and extensive training in their respective ministries.
The skills and knowledge they acquire allow the bureaucrats to carry out their administrative
duties with no major interruptions from politicians. In addition, the remarkable economic growth
in Malaysia reveals the positive impact that a professional and comparatively meritocratic
bureaucracy can contribute to economic growth, if the economic decision making is insulated
from political pressures.
In the Ethiopian polity, on the other hand, private economic interest is carefully monitored and
the possibility of an emerging leadership is limited. The functional requirements of economic
growth and diversification by and large are left up to the prerogative of the developmental state.
The bureaucracy is managed by civil servants, functionaries that are primarily recruited on
meritocracy and have clearly defined functional obligations to serve competently. Similarly in
Ethiopia, state functionaries are required to attend various in-service seminars or they are sent
abroad to upgrade their professional standards and skills. But the institutions within which the
http://www.ijmsbr.com
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various functionaries operate are not autonomous. “From an equal representation point of view,
the higher positions in governmental departments are assigned according to an ethnic-based
quota system. …the perception held by the public is that the bureaucrats are expected to operate
in line with their ethnic affiliation rather than in pursuit of the goals of the organization” (Desta,
2012, p. 20). In addition, the state-driven developmental model is conditioned on a set of
paradigmatic practices such as cronyism and unofficial favoritism for selecting and allocating a
number of business firms from certain ethnic groups.
Insulation of Bureaucracy from Political and Societal Forces
The Malaysian developmental state goal is to achieve rapid economic development. Thus, it
gives power and authority to the bureaucracy to plan, supervise and implement efficient policies.
Like Malaysian bureaucrats, Ethiopian elites are highly skilled and well-motivated individuals
who are the most talented graduates of the best universities in the country and abroad.
Nonetheless, because they are recruited with regard to ethnic affiliation, they are strongly
influenced by the ruling elites accountable to their regional state. Thus, Ethiopia, like Malaysia,
appears to be a developmental state that has practiced judicious state intervention at some points,
but the state interventions at other points seem to be achieved through ethnic political bargaining.
Because of this, the bureaucratic leaders and high-ranking civil servants in Ethiopia are involved
in widespread corruption. Instead of having selfless devotion to the Ethiopian economy, civil
servants have become political cadres recruited for the maintenance of the party in power.
Though non-partisan professional public service is a prerequisite for a developmental state, the
plans Ethiopia designed did neither take feedback from the private sector nor establish an
interface relationship between the ruling party cadres, who focus mostly on policy-related and
political matters in their departments or ministry, and those appointed as civil servants, who are
also known as the “politics-administration interface” (See for example, Maphunye, April 2009).
The developmental plans are too ambitious and are not initially based on the well-established
infrastructure that would have engineered Ethiopia’s take off strategy. For example, unlike what
is heavily practiced in Japan and to some extent in Malaysia, the bureaucracy is far removed
from the corporate sector. Former government officials of Ethiopia are rarely encouraged to take
positions in top posts of private corporations after retirement where they could be engaged in
transforming the institutions.
Market-orientations and Foreign Direct Investment
With feedback from the private sector and by allowing the market to operate freely, the Malaysia
developmental state is heavily involved in designing its developmental plans, creating
implementation strategies and constructing summative evaluation techniques. To serve its
national developmental goals the Malaysian developmental state has created a stable state, and
invested heavily in infrastructure such as highways, electricity, telecommunication, and
information technology. It provides health services, quality housing, schools for its citizens and
http://www.ijmsbr.com
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has introduced long-term state-determined incentives, all necessary for development. This
approach enabled Malaysia’s phenomenal success in attracting foreign direct investors to invest
in the country. To make its products globally competitive, the Malaysian economy is open and
has upgraded the quality of its administrative and production system to the level of receiving
international recognition in form of the ISO 9000 certification. Thus, the Malaysian government
is doing everything possible to make the Malaysian economy competitive while also achieving
sustainability. As stated by Khoo (2007), the Malaysia’s rapid growth trajectory is based on the
global market.
Shifting from an agricultural to an industrial economy is very strenuous, so to speed up
Ethiopia’s industrialization process and climb higher on the developmental ladder, Ethiopia is
spending about 20% of its GDP to reengineer its infrastructure, such as roads, schools, railways,
air transport, dams, and telecommunication services. The economy is controlled by the
government and not entirely adapted to the market. To entice foreign investors, the Ethiopian
government is giving special investment incentives to create a favorable environment for foreign
capital. For example, contrary to the argument that the country could face depleted soil, dry
aquifers, and a ruined ecosystem from chemical overuse (Mersha, 2009), Ethiopia is leasing
virgin farmlands and bestowing tax holidays and tax relief to foreign investors. However,
foreign investors in the agricultural sector are crowding out domestic investors. Being less
regulated to follow domestically-mandated requirements to reinvest some of their profits in
Ethiopia, foreign corporations in Ethiopia are creating problems such as land grabs. In addition,
few multinational corporations operating in Ethiopia are effective in creating jobs. They bring
capital and technology, but are not helping Ethiopia to gain access to world markets for the
benefit of Ethiopia.
Democratic Governance
According to the Malaysian government, democratic values are Western constructs, purposely
designed to impose Western values on non-Western countries. Therefore, the Malaysian state is
prolonging the conversion to democracy until it achieves sustainable development (Mohammed,
T. 1994). Based on this stand, it is generally argued that development in Malaysia requires better
state action and not Western-induced democratic values. Currently the Malaysia state is
governed by a powerful bureaucracy, incomplete democratic institutions, and limited political
freedom.
Unlike the Malaysian Developmental state, Ethiopia at times has exhibited appalling
human rights violations. Even so, the EPRDF Party without undertaking institutional reforms
appears to be implementing, simultaneously, the twin-tracked approach of democratization and
developmental state. The EPRDF ruling party in Ethiopia constantly argues that it is applying
fair, good governance and equitable administration, as well as fair judicial and electoral practices
so that Ethiopia appears to be a democratic developmental state. Various opposition groups, on
http://www.ijmsbr.com
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the other hand, feel that because Ethiopia is strongly centralized, the ruling party is using
democratic governance for window dressing. Instead of holding elections on a broad suffrage
basis, the opposition parties argue that the outcomes of elections in Ethiopia have been
fraudulent and undemocratic. Though the elections held in Ethiopia are based on broad suffrage,
those elected are mainly political cadres and the outcomes of the elections have been
predetermined. During the 2010 election, for example, the US Assistant Secretary of State for
African Affairs, Johnnie Carson, and the Chief European Union (EU) observer, Thijis Berman,
argue that while the elections were peaceful and well organized, they were not played on an even
playing field (BBC news, May 25, 2010). Moreover, the judiciary system currently in Ethiopia is
executively controlled as an extension of the ruling party. Since a prerequisite for democracy
involves the participation of all concerned citizens in decision-making processes, the Ethiopian
governance system needs to restructure its institutions to provide information held by public
authorities to empower the masses and ensure the developmental state model bears fruit.
Summary and Policy Implications
Based on the analysis given in Table 2, it can be concluded that unlike the conceptual framework
forwarded by the Economic Commission for Africa, Ethiopia’s democratic developmental state
is unique, different from the Malaysian developmental state model. Economically, Ethiopia has
recorded a staggering economic growth. From 2005-2011, as targeted by the Developmental
state, Malaysia’s GDP grew at 5.23%. The incidence of poverty in Malaysia has declined from
49% in 1970 to less than about 5% in 2000. Without speeding the direction of industrialization
and mainly being plan-oriented rather than being a full market-oriented system, from 2005 to
2011, Ethiopia achieved an average of 9.9% growth rate in its GDP. With the miraculous
economic growth, the poverty reduction in Ethiopia as measured by poverty head count has
declined from 41.9 in 2005 to 29.6 percent in 2011. However, unlike the Malaysian
developmental plan which is based on free market economic system, Ethiopia seems to be
portrayed as a predatory state that has embarked on a state-led market system.
The Developmental State Model assumes that the organizational set-up of the state needs to be
manned by highly disciplined professional government functionaries and technocrats, recruited
based on meritocracy to fulfill clearly spelled out functional obligations. Also, it is assumed that
non-partisan professional public service is a prerequisite to a developmental state. However, the
developmental plans in Ethiopia are too ambitious and have not been founded on a wellestablished financial and infrastructural base that could have engineered Ethiopia’s take off
strategy. In fact it can be argued that Ethiopia’s plans have been designed solely by politicians
without taking feedback from the private sector. As it stands now, Ethiopia’s developmental
state is not operating in a market-friendly environment. A number of the government-initiated
developmental plans are either obstructed or unduly delayed for implementation because some of
the government functionaries lack the professionalism or commitment needed to mobilize the
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limited resources of the nation. They appear to be interested in maximizing their own benefits by
imposing hidden rent-seeking agendas.
Table 2: Developmental State or Democratic Developmental State
in Malaysia and Ethiopia: A Comparative Overview
Indicators
Malaysia
Ethiopia
For the last seven years, (i.e., 2005- From 2005-2011, Ethiopia
Economic Growth
2011), Malaysia’s GDP grew at 5.23 without speeding the direction
percent. As targeted by the Malaysian of industrialization and mainly
Developmental target, the incidence being plan-oriented rather than
of poverty in Malaysia declined from fully market-oriented, has
49% in 1970 to about 5% in 2000. achieved an average 9.9%
Similarly, due to poverty reduction growth rate in its GDP.
and access to health services and the With
recorded
economic
expansion
of
the
Malaysian growth, poverty reduction
economy), the HDI of Malaysia measured by poverty head
improved only by 3.1% from 2005- count in Ethiopia has declined
2011.
from 41.9% in 2005 to 29.6%
in 2011. Due to poverty
Seventy percent of school age reduction, access to health
children in Malaysia complete benefits and expansion of the
primary and secondary schools; only economy,
the
Human
24 percent of Ethiopian children Development Index (HDI)
complete their primary and secondary improved by 16% but it is
schooling. Thus, Malaysia gives more about 22% less than the
emphasis on investment in human average score of the subcapital as an important ingredient for Saharan
countries.
The
economic transformation as asserted Ethiopian developmental state
by its developmental state model.
seems to have played an
important role in underpinning
quantitative economic growth.
However, low income people
aren’t benefiting from the
staggering economic growth of
the country. The poverty ratio
of people living on less than
$1.25 a day is very close to
30%.
Ethiopia’s
GDP
expenditure on education is
5.5%, compared to Malaysia’s
4.6%. But the education index
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of Ethiopia is only 0.237
compared to 0.73 for Malaysia.

Vision
of Developmental model from Japan and
Developmental State South Korea. The 2020 Malaysian
Vision was planned by its government
with a clear vision of development to
attain a fully developed nation, to
facilitate growth with improved equity
and to reduce poverty. It works
cooperatively (or is embedded) with
the private sector.

Development model from
Malaysia. In addition, the
Ethiopian state envisions a
democracy
that
ensures
popular participation. Its plans
entail not only to attain the
Millennium
Development
Goals by 2015 but also to
becoming a middle income
country by 2020- 2030.

and The government bureaucrats are
recruited through a rigorous national
examination system and they carry
out their duties autonomously without
interference from politicians.

Civil servants are by and large
recruited on meritocracy but
are at the discretion of the
Ethiopian
Peoples
Revolutionary
Democratic
Front (EPRDF) to carry out
their duties. .
Ethiopian elites are highly
skilled and well-motivated
individuals who are the most
talented
graduates
of
universities in the country and
from abroad. Nonetheless,
because they are recruited
according to ethnic affiliation,
they are strongly influenced by
the ruling party.

Professional
Meritocratic
Bureaucrats

Insulation
of
Bureaucracy from
Political and Societal
Forces

The Malaysian developmental state
goal is to achieve rapid economic
development. Thus, it gives power
and authority to the bureaucracy to
plan, supervise and implement
efficient policies.

The
Economic The Malaysian economy is largely
driven,
planned
by
System and Foreign market
professional elites who also gets input
Direct Investment
from the private sector, and is
accountable to the public. The
http://www.ijmsbr.com
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Malaysian economy is competitive investment, the government is
and its growth trajectory is based on in the process of creating an
the global market.
investment-friendly
environment
for
foreign
investors..But, foreign firms
are crowding out domestic
investors.
Malaysia looks at democratic values Without
undertaking
as
Western
constructs,
not institutional reforms tailored to
transferrable to the Malaysian facilitate human rights, the
environment.
Therefore, it is Ethiopian
People
generally agreed in Malaysia that Revolutionary
Democratic
development requires better state Front (EPRDF), seems to be
action and not Western induced committed to a process of
democratic
values
to
achieve implementing simultaneously
sustainable development. In short, the twin-tracked approach of
The basic argument in Malaysia is democratization
and
development first and democracy development.
later.

Bureaucratic elites who design and manage Ethiopia’s short and long term plans are not
politically neutral and do not get necessary feedback from the public. Therefore, if Ethiopia
desires to use the state as a very important vehicle to tackle its deep-seated developmental
problems, it needs to create a system for constant improvement of its public administration sector
to keep employees politically neutral and professionally competent and to ensure that the
appointment of government elites is transparent and based on due process.
At present, based on the analysis, it can be concluded that the Ethiopian political system is
neither a developmental state like Malaysia nor striving towards the ideals of a democratic
developmental state. It seems confounded, giving the appearance of operating as a centrallyplanned economic system. However, the bureaucracy is not disciplined. Its management system
manifests extreme forms of inefficiency and endemic corruption. Given that Ethiopia’s existing
developmental state model is dysfunctional, it has been an obstacle to the implementation of
well- intentioned poverty-minimizing reforms. It is weighted down by rent-seeking abuse and an
inefficient organizational set up. If Ethiopia desires the Malaysian developmental state to be its
role model it needs to institutionalize a free market system, retool its infrastructure, create
institutions capable of staging the necessary developmental state, and free the bureaucratic elites
from political influence. Since the foundation of a developmental state is based on good
governance, Ethiopia like Malaysia needs to form a state run by autonomous professional elites
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with the capacity to determine the direction of the country by getting necessary feedback from
the public and private sectors.

Finally, the question must be asked, “Is the Malaysian Developmental State Model the right one
for Ethiopia?” Economic globalization has caused the appreciation of currencies and precipitated
a huge influx of direct foreign investment and portfolio capital into Malaysia. However, the lack
of prudent financial market regulations and the emergence of innovative investment practices
have resulted in excessive private debt in hard currencies, fluctuation in asset prices, and severe
exchange rate fluctuation. It is possible to argue that the distinctive Malaysian developmental
state model that is suggested by the Economic Commission of Africa is too outdated to be
replicated in Africa. In short, in this era of globalism, the Malaysian type of development may
not be the right template for Ethiopia. If the Ethiopian government is willing to relinquish its
direct control over many community organizations and abide by democratic values, it could
sustain its economic growth and adequately feed its people, by going back to practicing
sustainable agriculture because agriculture is the backbone of the Ethiopian economy. Ethiopia’s
sustainable economic model should be based on integrated, environmentally sensitive, and
cooperative agriculture because the lives of more than 30 million Ethiopians are at stake and
living below the poverty line (see for example, Kofi and Desta, 2008). Stated differently, if a
democratic sustainable developmental state is to be effective in Ethiopia, a radical and farreaching set of constitutional revisions must be established to dismantle the bureaucraticexecutive state. Since more than 80 percent of the Ethiopia population lives in rural areas,
Ethiopia needs to intensify its agricultural base to feed its own people rather than to be aimlessly
flirting with irrelevant Western capitalist models and attempting to replicate the Malaysian
Developmental state model.
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